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In	network	systems,	the	same	connections	that	provide	functionality	can	also	serve	as	conduits	for	
the	spread	of	failures	and	innovations	that	would	otherwise	be	limited	to	small	areas.	
	
It	is	just	a	small	exaggeration	to	say	that	we	have	reached	the	“network	age.”	Now	both	more	
systems	are	recognized	as	networks—think	of	engineered	materials,	intracellular	media,	organismal	
physiology,	ecological	systems,	swarming	robots—and	more	networks	have	come	into	existence	
due	to	human	activity—global	financial	and	transportation	networks;	continental-wide	power	grids;	
the	Internet;	and	large-scale	social,	communication,	and	information	networks	(Adilson	E.	Motter	
and	Réka	Albert,	Physics	Today,	April	2012,	page	43).	A	characteristic	property	of	networks	is	their	
ability	to	propagate	influences,	such	as	infectious	diseases,	behavioral	changes,	and	failures.	An	
especially	important	class	of	such	contagious	dynamics	is	that	of	cascading	processes.	These	
processes	include,	for	example,	cascading	failures	in	infrastructure	systems,	where	a	network	
component	may	fail	or	disable	itself	in	response	to	the	failure	of	other	components;	extinctions	
cascades	in	food-web	networks,	where	perturbation	to	the	population	of	one	species	may	cause	a	
sequence	of	others	to	undergo	extinction;	and	information	cascades	in	social	systems,	where	an	
individual’s	behavior	is	influenced	by	the	behavior	of	others	(Fig.	1,	Box).	
	
Cascading processes have intrinsic features that distinguish them from the simple contact processes 
that typically characterize other network-spreading phenomena like epidemic spreading and 
diffusion—which	we	can	illustrate	by	comparing	failures	in	a	power	grid	with	a	model	for	the	spread	
of	flu	in	an	unimmunized	population	of like individuals.	First,	the	likelihood	of	a	node	failing	
increases	non-additively	as	a	function	of	the	number	of	other	failures	in	the	neighborhood,	whereas	
in	epidemic	spreading	the	probability	of	acquiring	the	disease	from	a	neighboring	node	does	not	
depend	on	the	state	of	other	nodes.	For	example,	a	power	station	may	never	fail	if	only	one	
connected	station	has	failed,	whereas	an	individual	has	a	nonzero	probability	of	contracting	flu	even	
if	only	one	contact	has	the	virus.	Second,	the	propagation	of	cascading	failures	is	not	restricted	to	
being	local,	in	the	sense	that	a	power	station	may	fail	even	if	none	of	its	close	neighbors	have	failed,	
whereas	in	the	epidemic	case	the	virus	can	only	reach	an	individual	through	a	neighbor	that	is	
contaminated	(assuming	the	network	is	the	only	medium	for	the	transmission).	Third,	the	impact	of	
one	power	station	failure	on	other	individual	stations	can	be	disproportionally	large	compared	to	
the	average,	whereas,	all	other	factors	being	the	same,	the	transmission	probability	is	expected	to	
vary	little	across	different	flu-infected	individuals.	Each	of	these	properties,	although	illustrated	
here	for	cascading	failures	in	power	grids,	also	applies	to	most	other	cascading	processes.	
	
These	differences	have	major	implications.	The	non-additivity	means	that	cascades	can	be	more	
likely	to	propagate	in	networks	with	structures	that	allow	reinforcement	from	multiple	neighboring	
nodes	(or	connections),	such	as	locally	redundant	networks	despite	their	larger	average	node-to-
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node	distance	[1],	whereas	epidemics	propagate	more	efficiently	in	networks	with	long-range	
connections,	such	as	random	ones.	The	success	of	viral	marketing	and	information	sharing	through	
social	media,	for	example,	may	depend	critically	on	the	interplay	between	network	structure	and	
the	extent	to	which	this	property	underlies	the	dynamics.	The	non-locality	indicates	that	the	state	
change	of	a	node	may	remotely	change	the	state	of	other	nodes	without	changing	the	state	of	
intermediate	nodes	[2],	which	has	no	analog	in	epidemics.	This	property	is	expected	to	be	more	
pronounced	in	networks	with	small	clustering	and	large	average	path	length,	like	power	grids.	The	
disproportional	impact	means	that	the	influence	of	the	change	of	state	of	a	node	depends	not	only	
on	the	connectivity	pattern	of	the	node—instead,	the	node	itself	may	be	more	influential.	The	latter	
relates	to	the	important	issue	of	intrinsic	fitness	versus	position	in	the	network,	which	has	
implications	for	cascades	as	well	as	numerous	other	processes.		
	
Cascades	are	generally	associated	with	new	initiating	events	rather	than	equilibrium	states	or	an	
entity	that	has	been	persistent	in	the	network,	whereas	a	contagious	disease	can	remain	endemic	in	
a	nonhomogeneous	population	even	at	low	effective	spreading	rates.	For	example,	in	1970	
gonorrhea	led	the	list	of	infectious	diseases	in	the	United	States	despite	evidence	that	most	infected	
individuals	would	transmit	the	disease	to	less	then	one	partner	on	average.	The	proposed	
explanation	recognized	the	existence	of	a	core	(potentially	asymptomatic)	portion	of	the	population	
with	higher	infection	rate;	it	was	estimated	that	a	core	of	only	2%	of	the	susceptible	individuals	
would	be	responsible	for	60%	of	all	infections	[3].	Now,	had	this	been	a	cascade,	the	need	of	
reinforcement	would	effectively	limit	the	infected	population	to	the	core	and	nothing	else.	
	
These	distinctive	properties	have	ramifications	for	the	modeling,	detection,	and	control	of	cascade	
dynamics.	Incidentally,	while	here	we	refer	to	nodes	or	connections,	failure	or	adoption,	etc.	for	
concreteness,	in	the	most	general	case	a	cascade	can	involve	a	variety	of	status	changes	in	any	or	
multiple	types	of	network	components.	Accordingly,	for	many	examples	given,	similar	conclusions	
also	apply	to	different	forms	of	cascades.	
	
	
Box	–	Examples	of	cascades	
	
Cascades	are	self-amplifying	processes	that	may	cause	a	substantial	part	of	the	system	to	change	
behavior	in	response	to	a	relatively	small	event.	These	attributes	render	cascades	a	threat	in	
systems	in	which	failures	can	propagate	through	the	network,	such	as	in	blackout-causing	cascading	
failures	in	power	grids,	congestions	in	traffic	networks,	cascades	of	secondary	delays	in	air	
transportation,	default	cascades	in	financial	networks,	disruption	cascades	in	supply	networks,	
diseases	caused	by	malfunction	of	biochemical	pathways,	and	extinction	cascades	in	ecosystems.	
Cascades	also	underlie	the	operation	of	numerous	systems,	with	examples	including	biochemical	
cascades	in	signaling	networks,	plea	bargain	cascades	in	criminal	justice	systems,	and	cascades	of	
technology-adoption	and	cooperation	in	contributing	to	the	public	good	in	society.	In	certain	
scenarios,	cascades	of	interest	can	be	designed,	such	as	in	get-out-the-vote	and	other	behavior	
adoption	campaigns,	in	re-sharing	of	advertising	content	on	social	media,	including	Facebook	and	
Twitter,	and	in	viral	marketing	that	influences	purchasing	decisions	on	products.	
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Cascade	models		
	
An	initial	step	in	the	study	of	network	cascades	is	the	mathematical	representation	of	the	process.	
This	step,	as	it	turns	out,	is	nontrivial	because	while	spread—and	hence	self-amplification—is	an	
easy	feature	to	capture,	non-additivity,	non-locality,	and	disproportional	impact	are	not.	
Accordingly,	the	compromise	between	being	simple	enough	to	be	amenable	to	analysis	and	being	
comprehensive	enough	to	represent	reality	is	hard	to	come	by	for	models	of	cascade	dynamics.	
Significant	progress	has	been	made,	nevertheless,	by	tailoring	models	to	the	research	question	at	
hand.	Some	of	the	most	widely	studied	cascade	models	can	be	grouped	into	the	following	(not	
mutually	exclusive)	classes.		
	
Avalanche	models.	These	are	models	inspired	by	the	Bak-Tang-Wiesenfeld	sandpile	model	in	which	
a	grain	is	placed	on	a	random	node	at	each	time	step	and	nodes	topple,	distributing	their	grains	
(part	or	all)	to	the	neighbors,	when	a	threshold	is	achieved	(Fig.	2a).	Thus,	following	one	such	event,	
the	network	may	experience	no	further	toppling	or	a	toppling	cascade	that	impacts	multiple	nodes.	
The	thresholds	can	be	heterogeneous	across	the	network,	which	may	lead	to	disproportional	
impact;	avalanche	models	immediately	account	for	non-additivity,	but,	like	other	first-neighbor	
models,	they	do	not	allow	for	non-locality	[4,	5].	
	
Percolation-related	models.	In	these	models,	the	end	question	usually	is	whether	the	set	of	nodes	
that	change	state	percolate,	in	the	sense	of	forming	a	large-scale	connected	cluster	in	the	network	
(comprising	a	nonzero,	or	“macroscopic,”	portion	of	all	nodes	in	the	infinite	network	size	limit).	For	
this	reason,	even	though	the	specifics	of	the	dynamics	may	vary	from	model	to	model,	the	solution	
of	the	model	is	usually	reduced	to	a	percolation	problem,	which	is	purely	structural.	An	example	is	
the	threshold	model	[6],	used	to	study	many	types	of	cascades	in	social	systems,	in	which	the	state	
of	a	node	will	change	when	a	threshold	fraction	of	the	neighbors	have	changed	(Fig.	2b).	Notice	that	
this	model	does	not	account	for	disproportional	impact	or	non-locality,	although	it	accounts	for	
non-additivity.	The	solution	of	this	model	in	random	networks	shows,	for	example,	that	increasing	
the	heterogeneity	of	the	distribution	of	connections	per	node	makes	the	system	less	susceptible	to	
large-scale	cascades	but	increasing	the	heterogeneity	of	the	thresholds	makes	it	more	susceptible	
[7].	While	reducible	to	percolation	problems,	these	models	should	not	be	confused	with	percolation	
processes	used	to	study	the	structural	robustness	of	networks,	which	do	not	account	for	the	
dependent	failures	that	often	correspond	to	the	lion	share	of	all	failures	in	a	cascade.	
	
Statistical	models.	These	are	models	that	do	not	attempt	to	account	for	the	detailed	dynamics	or	
even	structure	of	the	network,	but	are	instead	designed	to	describe	the	expected	number	of	
network	elements	joining	the	cascade	in	each	generation	of	a	time-discretized	cascade	event.	A	
prime	example	of	such	bulk	models	is	branching	process	models	(Fig.	2c),	which	in	their	simplest	
form	are	characterized	by	a	main	parameter	λ	representing	the	average	number	of	offspring	failures	
for	each	parent	failure	in	the	previous	generation	(see,	e.g.,	[8]).	Because	these	models	do	not	
specify	the	causal	relations	between	parent	and	offspring	failures,	nor	the	identity	of	the	elements	
involved	in	the	cascade,	they	do	not	take	a	stand	on	any	of	the	properties	unique	to	cascades.	They	
can	permit,	however,	the	statistical	prediction	of	the	outcomes,	including	cascade	size,	based	on	
simulated	or	historical	data.	
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Flow	redistribution	models.	Many	real	networks	exhibiting	cascades	(traffic,	electric,	metabolic	
networks)	are	in	fact	flow	networks.	In	models	designed	to	capture	this	feature,	the	dynamics	is	
such	that	when	a	network	component	is	inactivated,	the	flow	through	that	component	is	
redistributed	over	other	nodes	and	connections,	potentially	reaching	the	capacity	of	those	elements	
(Fig.	2d).	The	capacity	can	be	a	hard	or	a	soft	constraint	and	may	imply	complete,	partial,	or	delayed	
failure,	or	just	saturation.	In	any	case,	a	failure	can	lead	to	further	flow	redistributions	and	failures.	
A	simple	model	incorporating	these	elements	is	one	in	which	the	flow	exchanges	between	any	two	
nodes	are	transmitted	through	the	shortest	paths	connecting	them	[9].	Despite	its	simplicity,	this	
model	captures	all	three	salient	properties	of	cascades	singled	out	above.	This	model	also	
reproduces	the	robust-yet-fragile	property	of	networks,	in	that	they	tend	to	be	robust	to	
perturbations	on	any	of	the	many	low	flow	components	but	fragile	when	one	of	the	few	high	flow	
components	is	perturbed.	System-specific	realistic	models	have	also	been	considered,	of	which	we	
highlight	the	power-grid	cascading	failure	models	based	on	the	simulations	of	power	flow	equations	
[10].	
	
In	contrast	with	the	models	above,	which	may	involve	ad	hoc	assumptions	tailored	to	reproduce	
cascades,	there	are	two	broad	classes	of	models	that	can	be	derived	directly	from	representations	
of	the	dynamics	in	the	network	and	that	reproduce	the	cascades	as	special	manifestations	of	that	
dynamics.		
	
Dynamical-systems	models.	These	are	models	directly	derived	from	the	dynamical	equations	
describing	the	state	of	the	network,	typically	in	the	form	of	a	large	set	of	coupled	ordinary	
differential	equations.	For	example,	in	a	food-web	network	these	could	be	the	consumer	resource	
equations,	and	in	a	network	of	power-grid	generators	they	could	be	the	swing	equations	that	follow	
from	Newton's	second	law.	These	systems	are	nonlinear,	dissipative,	and	generally	multi-stable,	
with	some	of	their	stable	states	(or	attractors)	representing	desired	states	(e.g.,	states	in	which	all	
species	coexist)	and	others	representing	undesired	states	(e.g.,	states	with	one	or	multiple	
extinctions).	In	this	“continuous”	description,	a	cascade	is	then	interpreted	as	the	process	through	
which	the	system	is	driven	by	a	perturbation	from	the	attraction	basin	of	a	desired	state	into	the	
attraction	basin	of	an	undesired	one,	and	then	evolves	towards	that	undesired	state	[11]	(Fig.	3a).	
One	of	the	benefits	of	such	models	is	that,	in	addition	to	immediately	accounting	for	all	defining	
properties	of	the	cascade	dynamics,	they	also	allow	the	study	of	numerous	implications.	For	
example,	in	the	presence	of	sequential	perturbations,	it	follows	immediately	that	the	outcome	will	
depend	strongly	on	the	order	and	timing	of	the	perturbations.	This	has	been	illustrated	for	
extinction	cascades,	where,	depending	on	perturbation	scheduling,	a	cascade	triggered	by	the	
suppression	of	one	species	often	can	be	enhanced,	inhibited,	or	completely	mitigated	by	the	
deliberate	suppression	of	other	species	[12].		
	
Agent-based	models.	These	are	models	that	are	implemented	using	agent-based	modeling,	which	is	
a	computational	framework	in	which	the	system	is	represented	as	a	collection	of	interacting	agents	
and	simulated	at	the	individual	rather	than	aggregate	level.	Each	agent,	which	may	represent	a	
node	in	a	network,	responds	to	the	behavior	of	neighboring	nodes	in	this	network	according	to	pre-
defined	rules	[13]	(Fig.	3b).	Agent-based	models	can	allow	fairly	realistic	representation	because	
they	are	applicable	even	when	so	many	details	need	to	be	included	that	it	is	no	longer	practical	to	
represent	the	system	in	terms	of	closed-form	equations.	They	also	naturally	account	for	possible	
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time	dependencies	in	the	network	of	interactions	between	agents.	These	models	can	be	used	to	
study	cascading	processes	in	a	variety	of	contexts,	ranging	from	power	engineering	and	molecular	
biology	to	economics.	
	
Another	way	in	which	cascading	models	can	be	classified	is	as	abstract	models,	simplified	models,	
and	detailed	models.	In	a	power	grid	[10],	for	example,	the	detailed	models	would	designate	the	
most	realistic,	causal	representation	of	the	system,	the	simplified	models	would	involve	some	
conscientious	approximations	(e.g.,	the	use	of	DC	power	flow	approximation),	and	abstract	models	
would	not	directly	account	for	the	physics	of	the	power	flows	but	instead	focus	on	implications,	
such	as	in	applications	of	branching	models.	Each	model	has	its	own	advantages	and	limitations,	and	
the	suitability	of	a	model	will	largely	depend	on	the	research	question	under	consideration.	
	
	
Early	detection	and	prediction	of	cascades	
	
Proper	response	to	a	cascade	event	requires	the	prediction	of	cascades	at	the	time	they	are	
triggered	or	early	detection	at	the	time	they	start	to	propagate.	While	it	is	in	principle	
straightforward	to	determine	when	a	network	component	changes	state,	the	system-wide	impact	of	
such	a	change	is	not,	which	by	itself	sets	constraints	on	one’s	ability	to	determine	the	potential	of	a	
given	condition	to	develop	further	into	a	cascade.	There	are	therefore	essentially	two	main	
scenarios	under	which	cascades	can	be	predicted:	1)	the	dynamics	is	known	and	can	be	simulated	
accurately	given	the	observed	state	of	the	network;	2)	data	is	available	from	previous	events	under	
similar	conditions	and	can	be	used	to	statistically	infer	the	outcome.	A	challenge	with	1)	is	that	each	
cascade	involves	a	potentially	different	complex	sequence	of	dependent	changes	of	state,	which	can	
be	sensitive	to	modeling	and	state	estimation	uncertainties	(much	in	the	same	way	as	the	long-term	
predictability	in	systems	as	simple	as	a	double-pendulum	can	be	compromised	by	small	
uncertainties	[Adilson	E.	Motter	and	David	K.	Campbell,	Physics	Today,	May	2013,	page	27]).	A	
difficulty	with	2)	is	that	large	cascades,	which	are	precisely	the	most	relevant	ones,	are	rare	events	
for	which	the	statistics	of	previous	events	tends	to	be	inherently	limited.		
	
Despite	these	challenges,	several	approaches	have	been	developed.	In	such	approaches,	one	may	
be	interested	in	a	binary	answer	(e.g.,	whether	or	not	a	cascade	is	likely),	a	continuous	answer	(the	
probability	of	a	cascade	as	a	function	of	cascade	size),	or	the	full	description	of	the	cascade	
trajectory.	In	the	latter	case,	one	may	seek	to	specify	not	only	the	size	but	also	the	time	evolution	of	
the	cascade	and	identities	of	the	network	components	involved.	
	
A	first	step	in	many	data	based	approaches	is	to	identify	features	that	are	strongly	correlated	with	
specific	cascade	outcomes.	For	example,	in	cascades	of	information	sharing	on	Weibo/Twitter	and	
Facebook,	the	activity	of	key	users	as	well	as	the	temporal	and	structural	properties	of	early-sharing	
events	are	all	strongly	correlated	with	the	occurrence	of	large	cascades	[14].	Making	use	of	these	
features,	some	approaches	employ	machine-learning	techniques	that	can	systematically	account	for	
multiple	such	correlations,	such	as	logistic	regression,	neural	networks,	and	support	vector	machine,	
to	predict	the	most	likely	outcomes.	Naturally,	in	the	real-time	detection	of	cascades,	a	potentially	
limiting	factor	for	many	approaches	is	the	time	required	for	collecting	and	processing	the	data	
	 6	
associated	with	sensing	the	state	of	the	network	elements,	which	has	to	be	smaller	than	the	time	
scale	for	the	propagation	of	the	cascade	itself.	
	
It	is	also	useful	to	consider	the	prediction	of	cascades	using	models.	On	the	one	hand,	properly	
validated	models	that	can	predict	the	dynamics	of	the	system	fairly	realistically,	such	as	the	TRELSS	
model	to	evaluate	power	network	reliability	[10],	can	be	simulated	in	tandem	with	the	observation	
of	the	real	system	to	predict	a	cascade	given	a	detected	perturbation.	The	use	of	such	models	is	
fundamentally	different	from	statistical	and	classification	approaches	as	they	seek	to	forecast	the	
dynamics	of	the	system	and	hence	do	not	rely	on	data	from	previous	cascades.	On	the	other	hand,	it	
is	conceptually	instructive	to	identify	within	models	the	key	factors	involved	in	giving	rise	to	
cascades.	At	the	most	elementary	level	one	can	simply	apply	approaches	such	as	the	ones	in	the	
previous	paragraph,	to	simulated	data	rather	than	empirical	data—for	example,	for	the	overload	
model	in	[9],	it	follows	that	cascades	are	more	likely	to	be	triggered	by	the	failure	of	nodes	with	high	
centrality.	Sensitivity	analysis	can	be	used	to	investigate	variants	of	the	latter	in	other	flow	networks	
(Fig.	4).	
	
In	the	study	of	models,	a	more	complete	characterization	is	also	possible	in	many	cases.	In	the	
threshold	model	on	random	networks	[7],	for	example,	the	activation	of	a	single	node	will	trigger	a	
large-scale	cascade	if	and	only	if	the	node	is	connected	to	a	large-scale	(i.e.,	“percolating”)	cluster	of	
early	adopters	(nodes	that	became	active	whenever	one	neighbor	becomes	active);	more	
profoundly,	in	sparsely	connected	networks	one	such	cascade	will	include	a	large-scale	portion	of	
non-early	adopters.	In	dynamical-systems	models	where	the	non-cascading	state	is	represented	as	a	
stable	state,	a	perturbation	will	generate	a	cascade	if	and	only	if	it	brings	the	system	outside	the	
attraction	basin	of	this	state	[11];	moreover,	since	the	entire	trajectory	of	the	cascade	can	be	
determined	by	evolving	the	trajectory	of	the	system,	the	final	state	of	the	cascade	can	be	predicted	
in	simulations.	Incidentally,	this	continuous	description	shows	that	it	is	a	simplification	to	think	of	a	
cascading	failure	as	the	process	in	which	one	failure	leads	to	another.	Instead,	it	is	the	continuous	
change	in	the	full	state	of	all	variables	that	drags	the	system	into	the	path	of	successive	failures—an	
observation	that	has	practical	implications	for	early	cascade	detection,	as	it	shows	that	it	is	not	
enough	to	track	the	component	failures.	In	a	power	grid,	for	example,	proper	intervention	requires	
the	cascade	to	be	detected	before	secondary	failures	occur—a	nontrivial	problem	closely	related	to	
the	problem	of	accurately	assessing	the	state	of	the	network.	
	
	
Mitigation,	enhancement,	and	control	of	cascades	
	
Whether	to	put	in	motion	a	cascade	of	interest	or	to	stop	a	detrimental	one,	cascade	control	is	a	
primary	ambition	in	the	study	of	cascade	dynamics.	A	convenient	way	to	think	about	cascade	
control	is	by	considering	the	manipulation	of	cascade	risk,	defined	as	the	product	between	the	
probability	of	cascade	occurrence	and	cascade	cost.	Risk	adequately	characterizes,	for	example,	the	
scenario	in	which	the	suppression	of	frequent	cascades	inadvertently	increases	the	likelihood	of	
rare	but	very	large	ones.	In	the	case	of	beneficial	cascades,	the	counterpart	of	risk	is	the	probability	
times	the	payoff—also	known	as	expected	utility.	More	generally,	such	objective	functions	can	be	
interpreted	as	“probability”	x	“size”	for	a	properly	defined	notion	of	cascade	size.		
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The	opportunities	for	control	may	be	different	depending	on	whether	the	goal	is	to	inhibit	or	
promote	cascades,	whether	the	system	is	engineered	or	natural,	and	the	extent	to	which	individual	
network	elements	can	be	“actuated”	before	and	after	a	cascade	is	initiated.	In	social	systems,	a	
conceptual	starting	point	for	the	launching	of	a	successful	(large)	cascade	of	information	sharing,	
technology	adoption,	or	behavioral	change,	is	the	notion	that	some	individuals	(or	organizations)	
are	significantly	more	influential	than	others—known	as	the	influentials	hypothesis	[15].		The	
concept	is	similar	in	spirit	to	disproportional	impact,	where	influence	may	depend	as	much	on	
network	position	as	on	reputation	and	other	aspects	of	intrinsic	fitness.	A	competing	hypothesis,	
supported	by	the	threshold	model,	is	that	there	are	no	influentials	and	that	the	ability	to	trigger	
cascades	depends	much	more	on	the	structure	of	the	network	(e.g.,	the	subnetwork	of	early	
adopters)	[15].	Studies	focused	on	maximizing	the	spread	of	influence	suggest	the	existence	of	
influentials	in	some	models	[16].	While	the	extent	to	which	influentials	are	influential	may	remain	
controversial,	the	idea	is	that	even	if	they	have	a	higher	threshold	for	joining	the	cascade,	once	they	
do	they	are	more	likely	to	cause	others	to	join,	making	them	ideal	targets	for	early	adoption.	
Needless	to	say,	another	control	parameter	in	this	case	is	the	appeal	of	the	subject	of	the	cascade	
(the	information,	technology,	or	behavior).	
	
In	engineered	networks,	on	the	other	hand,	the	most	immediate	action	toward	preventing	
cascading	failures	would	be	to	design	the	system	to	be	resilient,	with	components	that	are	not	
prone	to	fail	and/or	that	can	withstand	the	most	likely	disturbances,	or	to	be	robust	against	the	
failure	of	part	of	their	components.	In	a	related	body	of	work,	much	has	been	learned	from	research	
focused	on	identifying	network	properties	such	as	redundancy	and	community	structures	(see,	e.g.,	
[5])	that	have	the	potential	to	reduce	the	likelihood	of	cascading	failures.	A	complementary	layer	of	
protection	comes	from	proper	management	of	the	system.	A	power	grid,	for	example,	is	equipped	
with	controllers	at	multiple	levels	to	keep	the	system	balanced	under	normal	operating	conditions	
[Scott	Backhaus	and	Michael	Chertkov,	Physics	Today,	May	2013,	page	42],	which	combined	with	
proactive	operational	decisions	(e.g.,	adjustment	of	capacity	reserve	or	load	level	as	conditions	
change)	are	key	to	reduce	risk.	However,	while	a	necessary	step,	in	practice	no	engineering	effort	
can	completely	eliminate	the	possibility	of	occasional	failures	and	hence	of	the	occasional	triggering	
of	cascades	in	large	complex	networks	(and	system	redesign	would	not	always	be	an	option	in	
natural	and	resource-limited	networks).		
	
There	is	therefore	interest	in	what	could	be	perceived	as	the	most	ambitious	form	of	cascade	
control:	controlling	unforeseen	or	unavoidable	cascades	after	they	have	been	triggered.	Still	using	
the	power	grid	as	a	model	system,	consider	a	disturbance	that	either	causes	the	capacity	of	some	
components	to	be	violated	and/or	an	imbalance	between	power	demand	and	supply.	With	the	goal	
of	rebalancing	the	system	to	prevent	the	propagation	of	the	disturbance	while	minimizing	the	
amount	of	power	lost	(difference	between	power	demand	and	power	supplied),	some	of	the	main	
control	actions	that	can	be	taken	are	the	rerouting	of	power	flows,	load	shedding,	and	dispatch	of	
power	generation.	This	is	a	simplification,	of	course,	as	there	are	additional	factors	to	consider,	such	
as	time	scales,	other	instabilities,	cost	of	power	generation,	and	priority-circuits	(e.g.,	hospitals	vs.	
street	light).	In	any	case,	there	are	basically	two	main	types	of	approaches	to	address	the	problem	
of	minimizing	power	loss:	centralized	algorithms,	which	require	state	information	from	the	entire	
system	and	can	in	principle	deliver	a	globally	optimal	solution,	and	decentralized	ones,	which	rely	on	
local	state	information	and	can	generate	locally	optimal	solutions	that	are	computationally	less	
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expensive.	The	approach	that	is	most	adequate	will	depend	largely	on	the	scale	of	the	system	under	
consideration.	The	ongoing	development	of	smart	grids	will	lead	to	a	number	of	new	possibilities,	
such	as	real-time	pricing	and	large-scale	use	of	smart	appliances,	which	will	allow	control	not	only	of	
supply	and	delivery	but	also	of	demand.	The	latter	may	prove	crucial	to	increase	the	penetration	of	
renewables	from	intermittent	sources.	
	
Dynamical-systems	models	offer	a	particularly	insightful	context	for	the	post-triggering	control	of	
cascades.	In	these	models,	the	triggering	of	a	cascade	is	associated	with	an	event	that	brings	the	
system	outside	the	attraction	basin	of	the	desired	attractor.	The	goal	is	to	steer	the	trajectory	back.	
In	deterministic	systems	there	are	essentially	two	ways	in	which	that	can	be	done:	by	perturbing	the	
system	variables	to	bring	the	state	to	the	desired	basin	(Fig.	5a)	or	by	perturbing	the	system	
parameters	to	bring	the	desired	basin	to	the	state	(Fig.	5b)—the	extreme	of	which	is	a	bifurcation	
that	leaks	the	occupied	basin	into	the	other.	Using	the	game	of	billiard	to	build	an	analogy,	these	
two	approaches	would	be	akin	to	pocketing	the	balls	by	striking	then	with	a	cue	versus	by	tilting	the	
table	itself.	The	challenge	in	the	control	problem	is	that	constraints	on	feasible	interventions	limit	
the	directions	and	extent	to	which	one	can	move	in	state	and	parameter	space;	and	determination	
of	the	global	structure	of	the	basin	boundaries	(or	quasipotential)	of	the	system,	which	would	be	
required	in	simple	control	approaches,	is	computationally	impossible	in	the	typically	high-
dimensional	dynamics	of	large	networks.	Two	approaches	have	been	developed	recently	that	
overcome	these	challenges.	One	approach	locates	the	basin	of	the	target	attractor	without	any	a	
priori	information	about	its	location	[11].	The	other	approach	manipulates	the	height	of	the	
boundary	along	the	least	action	path	connecting	the	attractors	to	induce	a	bifurcation	that	
eliminates	the	undesired	attractor	while	not	changing	the	stability	of	other	states	in	the	system	[17].	
Within	the	dynamical-systems	modeling,	in	principle	one	can	go	beyond	suppressing	or	enhancing	
cascades	to	instead	control	the	entire	cascade	trajectory—which	can	be	relevant	to	avoid	adverse	
effects.	
	
	
Current	and	future	research	
	
Cascading	failures	are	prominent	in	the	realm	of	possible	threats	to	a	network	because	global	
effects	do	not	require	global	actions:	the	network	is	disrupted	not	by	the	disturbance	itself	but	by	
the	chain	of	events	it	puts	in	motion.	Like	in	the	case	of	other	spreading	phenomena,	traditionally	
more	effort	had	been	put	into	the	analysis	than	into	the	prediction	and	detection	of	cascades.	Yet,	
recent	advances	in	the	latter	combined	with	ongoing	advances	in	cascade	control	are	now	creating	
the	possibility	of	real-time	control	of	cascades	already	in	course.	Another	timely	topic	concerns	the	
post-cascade	dynamics	and,	in	particular,	the	nontrivial	matter	of	restoring	the	system	after	a	
cascading	failure.	
	
More	broadly,	essentially	every	problem	discussed	here	is	still	work–in-progress	around	which	
significant	research	activities	continue	to	take	place.	This	includes	the	discovery	of	new	mechanisms	
underlying	cascades,	relations	between	network	structure	and	cascade	dynamics,	trade-off	between	
resilience	to	frequent	versus	large	cascades,	control	in	the	presence	of	uncertainty,	characterization	
of	the	extent	to	which	the	trajectories	of	different	cascades	are	different,	identification	of	common	
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features	across	different	domains,	experimental	validation	of	longstanding	hypotheses,	and	
development	of	new	applications	that	leverage	cascades—just	to	name	a	few.	
	
The	above	applies	not	only	to	systems	modeled	as	a	single	network	with	a	single	type	of	node	and	a	
single	type	of	interaction,	but	also	to	many	networks	composed	of	multiple	types	of	nodes	and	
interactions.	In	social	networks,	for	instance,	individuals	may	be	distinguished	by	gender,	age,	
profession,	and	other	characteristics;	their	interactions	may	be	physical	or	virtual,	personal	or	
professional,	etc.	The	same	applies	to	many	other	complex	systems.	A	city,	for	example,	can	be	
regarded	as	a	network	that	includes	infrastructural,	social,	economic,	and	biophysical	network	
layers	that	interact	with	one	another.	While	most	of	the	discussion	carried	out	this	far	applies	to	
such	systems	when	regarded	as	one	network,	even	if	a	heterogeneous	one,	it	is	sometimes	
convenient	to	separate	the	network	layers	of	different	nature	and	regard	the	system	as	a	network	
of	interacting	networks	(also	referred	to	by	a	number	of	other	terms,	such	as	multilayer	and	
multirelational	networks).	Additional	questions	about	cascades	arise	when	adopting	this	
description,	such	as	the	differences	(if	any)	from	the	case	in	which	each	component	network	is	
assumed	to	operate	in	isolation.		
	
Taking	for	concreteness	the	case	of	two	networks	of	N	nodes	each,	coupling	between	the	two	
networks	creates	the	possibility	that	a	cascade	initiated	in	one	network	will	propagate	to	the	other	
network,	hence	leading	to	a	larger	cascade	than	in	a	single	network.	This	does	not	mean,	of	course,	
that	the	cascade	will	be	any	larger	than	it	would	be	in	a	single	network	of	2N	nodes.	The	coupling	
between	two	networks	may	also	reduce	the	risk	of	cascades,	as	shown	for	a	model	network	
consisting	of	similar	sub-networks	coupled	together	[5],	and	as	expected	when	one	network	
stabilizes	the	other	(as	is	the	case	for	regulatory	or	control	networks).	Interdependent	networks	(a	
special	type	of	interacting	networks)	serve	as	another	instructive	example.	In	the	simplest	form	of	
such	networks,	each	node	has	to	be	connected	to	nodes	from	different	networks	in	order	to	be	
functional.	It	has	been	shown	that,	depending	on	the	details	of	the	model	and	network	structure,	
interdependence	may	make	cascades	and	percolation	transitions	both	more	and	less	abrupt	[18].	
The	impact	of	interactions	between	networks	is	therefore	far	from	obvious,	likely	system-specific,	
and	yet	to	be	fully	understood.	
	
The	consequences	of	a	cascade	in	a	network	can	be	undesired	or	desired,	depending	on	the	system,	
on	the	subject	of	the	cascade,	and	on	the	beholder.	The	understanding,	modeling,	and	control	of	
cascades	have	been	longstanding	problems	of	practical	importance	in	various	application	areas,	
which	have	nevertheless	been	successfully	advanced	by	recent	research	in	network	dynamics.	We	
suggest	that	the	solution	to	pressing	problems	as	diverse	as	the	development	of	self-healing	
networks,	the	discovery	of	new	therapeutic	treatments,	the	prevention	of	widespread	financial	
crises,	and	the	design	of	effective	behavior	change	campaigns,	will	all	directly	benefit	from	future	
advances	in	this	rapidly	developing	multidisciplinary	field.	
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Figure	1.	Examples	of	cascades	in	networks.	(a)	July	2,	1996	cascading	blackout	in	the	Western	North	
American	grid,	in	which	a	sequence	of	line	outages	(red	bars)	separated	the	network	into	five	islands	(colored	
areas),	affecting	more	than	two	million	customers	(adapted	from	the	WECC	Disturbance	Report).	(b)	Cascade	
of	population	declines	caused	by	the	loss	of	the	black-tailed	prairie	dog	in	the	USA’s	central	grassland,	which	
led	to	the	decline	(red	arrows)	in	predators	and	other	species	that	depend	on	the	habitat	that	they	create	
(adapted	from	B.J.	Bergstrom	et	al.,	Conserv.	Lett.	7,	131	(2014)).	(c)	Social	cascade	underlying	the	2010-12	
Arab	Spring	protests,	where	the	dominant	Facebook	friendship	connections	are	shown	as	a	proxy	of	the	
influence	across	counties	(adapted	from	C.D.	Brummitt	et	al.,	J.	R.	Soc.	Interface	12,	20150712	(2015)).	(d)	
Example	of	neuronal	avalanche	color-coded	by	latency,	where	a	cascade	of	bursts	of	neuronal	activity	
propagates	in	the	brain	(adapted	from	J.M.	Palva	et	al.,	Proc.	Natl.	Acad.	Sci.	USA	110,	3585	(2013)).	
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Figure	2.	Schematic	representation	of	cascade	models.	(a)	Sandpile	model	on	a	lattice,	where	the	center	
node	reaches	the	threshold	for	toppling	(assumed	to	be	four).	(b)	Threshold	model	for	an	example	
assignment	of	adoption	threshold	(marked	next	to	the	nodes).	(c)	Branching-process	model	(in	which	the	
maximum	number	of	offspring	failures	per	parent	failure	is	three),	for	cases	where	the	number	of	new	
failures	in	each	generation	(gen)	is	larger	(green),	smaller	(blue),	and	equal	(red)	to	the	critical	number	for	
cascade	growth	(adapted	from	T.P.	Vogels,	et	al.	Annu.	Rev.	Neurosci.	28,	357	(2005)).		(d)	Flow-
redistribution	model,	where	the	inactivation	of	one	connection	(cross	sign)	causes	the	increase	of	flow	
through	other	connections	(red).	
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Figure	3.	Schematic	representation	of	cascade	models	(continued).	(a)	Dynamical-systems	model,	where	a	
perturbation	(red	arrow)	can	drive	the	system	towards	an	attractor	representing	a	cascade	state.	(b)	Agent-
based	model,	where	at	each	time	step	each	agent	follows	pre-defined	rules	to	update	its	state	(red	or	green)	
on	the	basis	of	the	states	of	others.	
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Figure	4.	Sensitivity	map	of	the	Iceland	power	network,	where	the	color	on	each	load	node	indicates	the	
change	in	the	aggregated	flow	over	all	power	lines	as	power	demand	on	that	node	is	increased	by	1%.	The	
percentage	is	relative	to	the	total	power	generated	in	the	network.	To	keep	the	balance	of	supply	and	
demand,	power	demand	is	decreased	uniformly	across	all	other	load	nodes.	Loads	are	indicated	by	circles,	
while	squares	represent	generators.	
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Figure	5.	Control	of	cascades	in	a	dynamical-systems	description,	where	the	initial	state	is	in	the	basin	of	an	
undesired	attractor.	A	system	on	the	verge	of	cascading	can	be	nudged	back	toward	a	target	attractor	by	
perturbing	either	(a)	the	state	(red	dot)	to	move	the	system	toward	the	target	basin	or	(b)	tunable	
parameters	to	shift	the	boundary	between	the	desired	and	undesired	basins	of	attraction	(dashed	line).	
Lighter	colors	represent	deeper	points	in	the	attraction	basins,	and	contours	are	lines	of	equal	depth.	
(Adapted	from	refs.	[11]	and	[17].)	
	
